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1 by reason of its general sense
Общая лексика: по своему общему смыслуУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > by reason of its general sense
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2 by reason of its general sense
Новый англо-русский словарь > by reason of its general sense
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3 reason
reason [ˊri:zn]1. n1) причи́на, по́вод, основа́ние; соображе́ние, моти́в; до́вод, аргуме́нт; оправда́ние;by reason of по причи́не; из-за
;by reason of its general sense по своему́ о́бщему смы́слу
;with ( или not without) reason не без основа́ния
;he complains with reason он име́ет все основа́ния жа́ловаться
;to give reasons for smth. объясни́ть причи́ны чего́-л., сообщи́ть свои́ соображе́ния по по́воду чего́-л.
2) ра́зум, рассу́док; благоразу́мие;to bring to reason образу́мить
;to hear ( или to listen to) reason прислу́шаться к го́лосу ра́зума
3) здра́вый ум;to lose one's reason сойти́ с ума́
;а) умалишённый;б) без созна́ния, без чувств2. v1) рассужда́ть (about, of, upon — о чём-л.)2) убежда́ть, угова́ривать (into);to reason out of smth. разубежда́ть в чём-л.
;to reason with smb. урезо́нивать кого́-л.
3) аргументи́ровать; дока́зывать4) обсужда́тьreason out проду́мать до конца́ -
4 reason
[ˈri:zn]actual reason истинная причина bereft of reason без сознания, без чувств bereft of reason умалишенный reason разум, рассудок; благоразумие; to bring to reason образумить; to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума; to lose one's reason сойти с ума reason причина, повод, основание; соображение, мотив; довод, аргумент; оправдание; by reason of по причине; из-за by reason of its general sense по своему общему смыслу cogent reason убедительная причина compelling reason неопровержимый довод to give reasons (for smth.) объяснить причины (чего-л.), сообщить свои соображения (по поводу чего-л.) with (или not without) reason не без основания; he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться reason разум, рассудок; благоразумие; to bring to reason образумить; to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума; to lose one's reason сойти с ума reason разум, рассудок; благоразумие; to bring to reason образумить; to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума; to lose one's reason сойти с ума primary reason основная причина reason аргумент reason аргументировать; доказывать; reason out продумать до конца reason излагать мотивы reason интеллект reason мотив reason обсуждать reason основание reason причина, повод, основание; соображение, мотив; довод, аргумент; оправдание; by reason of по причине; из-за reason причина reason разум, рассудок; благоразумие; to bring to reason образумить; to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума; to lose one's reason сойти с ума reason разум reason рассуждать (about, of, upon - о чем-л.) reason соображение reason убеждать, уговаривать (into); to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.); to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) reason убеждать, уговаривать (into); to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.); to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) reason for remission of sentence основание для освобождения от наказания reason for termination основание для прекращения reason of complaint основание для подачи жалобы reason of complaint основание для подачи иска reason аргументировать; доказывать; reason out продумать до конца reason убеждать, уговаривать (into); to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.); to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) reason to believe основание считать strong reason веское основание strong: reason сильный, веский; серьезный; strong sense of disappointment сильное разочарование; strong reason веская причина valid reason веское соображение valid reason убедительный довод with (или not without) reason не без основания; he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться -
5 reason
1. noun1) разум, рассудок; благоразумие; to bring to reason образумить; to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума; to lose one's reason сойти с ума;bereft of reasonа) умалишенный;б) без сознания, без чувств2) причина, повод, основание; соображение, мотив; довод, аргумент; оправдание; by reason of по причине; из-за; by reason of its general sense по своему общему смыслу; with (или not without) reason не без основания; he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться; to give reasons for smth. объяснить причины чего-л., сообщить свои соображения по поводу чего-л.Syn:mind2. verb1) рассуждать (about, of, upon о чем-л.)2) обсуждать3) убеждать, уговаривать (into); to reason out of smth. разубеждать в чем-л.; to reason with smb. урезонивать кого-л.4) аргументировать; доказыватьreason outSyn:argue* * *1 (n) интеллект; причина; разум; рассудок2 (v) делать выводы; логически рассуждать; размышлять* * *разум, благоразумие* * *[rea·son || 'rɪːzn] n. причина, основание, мотив, резон, соображение; оправдание, повод, аргумент, довод; разум, интеллект, рассудок; здравый рассудок, здравый ум, благоразумие v. размышлять, рассуждать; делать вывод, умозаключать; обсуждать, убеждать, уговаривать; аргументировать, доказывать* * *аргументаргументироватьблагоразумиедоводитьдоказыватьздравомыслиемотивобдуматьобдумыватьоснованиеповодпредлогприводпризракпричинаразумрассудительностьрассудокрацияум* * *1. сущ. 1) разум 2) благоразумие, здравомыслие; здравый смысл 3) а) причина б) соображение, мотив; довод, аргумент; оправдание (against; behind; for) 2. гл. 1) рассуждать, размышлять (about, of, upon - о чем-л.); делать выводы 2) убеждать, уговаривать (into) -
6 reason
ˈri:zn
1. сущ.
1) разум, рассудок, ум, интеллект bereft of reason Syn: mind, brain, intellect, mentality
2) благоразумие, здравомыслие;
здравый смысл within reason ≈ в пределах разумного to stand to reason ≈ быть ясным, понятным;
казаться само собой разумеющимся It stands to reason that the majority party will be reelected. ≈ Кажется разумным, что снова будет избрана партия большинства. I'll do anything for you within reason. ≈ Я сделаю для Вас все в пределах разумного. sound reason Syn: prudence, discretion
3) а) причина, повод, основание, основа by reason of ≈ по причине;
из-за to have a reason for not going ≈ иметь уважительную причину, чтобы не идти( куда-л.) The real reason behind their decision was never made public. ≈ Настоящая причина этого решения никогда не объявлялась. The reason that/why she did it is a mystery. ≈ По какой причине она это сделала, остается загадкой. He quit for personal reasons. ≈ Он уволился по личным причинам. cogent reason compelling reason convincing reason every reason plausible reason strong reason sufficient reason underlying reason urgent reason valid reason б) соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание (against;
behind;
for) personal reason
2. гл.
1) рассуждать, размышлять (about, of, upon - о чем-л.) ;
делать выводы Syn: think, consider
2) убеждать, уговаривать( into) to reason out of smth. ≈ разубеждать в чем-л. to reason with smb. ≈ урезонивать кого-л. reason into
3) аргументировать, обосновывать;
доказывать, приводить доводы a carefully reasoned analysis ≈ тщательно аргументированный анализ Syn: argue
4) уст. обсуждать, дискутировать Syn: discuss ∙ reason against reason away reason out reason with Syn: argue причина;
основание - the * of eclipses причина затмений - what is the * of the tides? почему бывают приливы? - what is the * of the dew? почему выпадает роса? - she had a * for laughing у нее была причина для смеха - by * of..., for the * that... по причине того, что..., из-за того, что... - the scheme failed by * of bad organization этот план провалился из-за плохой организации - for no other * than that I forgot( разговорное) по той простой причине, что я забыл - for *s beyond control по независящим обстоятельствам - with * с основанием, по основательным причинам - not without * не без основания - with good * с полным правом /основанием/, совершенно обоснованно - he complains with * у него есть основания жаловаться( субъективное) основание, мотив, соображение;
оправдание - for economy *s по соображениям экономии - for family *s по семейным обстоятельствам - for *s of State обыкн. (ироничное) по государственным соображениям - *s for and against doing smth. соображения за и против какого-л. поступка - to give *s for one's preference обосновать свой выбор - to give *s for doing smth. объяснить свои поступки;
изложить мотивы, по которым что-л. должно быть сделано - to prove with *s доказать аргументами, представить резонные соображения - I saw * to suspect him у меня были основания подозревать его - I have good * to fear that... у меня все основания /я имею полное право/ опасаться, что... - I have good *s for doing this я имею полное право поступать так - did he give any *? он привел какие-л. доводы?;
он что-нибудь привел в свое оправдание? - give me your *s for refusing мотивируйте свой отказ, изложите мотивы вашего отказа - alleging as his * that... мотивируйте тем, что... - the * behind the proposal мотивировка предложения - for *s best known to oneself( разговорное) по каким-то таинственным соображениям - I see no * to do this не вижу никакой необходимости делать это - all the more * for going /why I should go/ (мне) тем более следует уехать - the * why I dislike him is... он мне не нравится потому, что... объяснение, обоснование;
мотивированное заявление - a woman's * (ироничное) женская логика - *s adduced (юридическое) мотивы постановления суда - to give /to yield, to render/ (a) * предоставить (дать) объяснения (своему поведению и т. п.) (логика) малая посылка( силлогизма) разум, интеллект - pure * (философское) чистый разум - only man has * только человек - существо разумное здравый рассудок (в противоп. сумасшествию) - bereft of * умалишенный - to lose one's * сойти с ума, помешаться - his * failed him utterly его рассудок совершенно помутился - he was restored to * к нему вернулся рассудок (о сумасшедшем) часто( разговорное) здравый смысл, благоразумие, здравомыслие - to bring smb. to * образумить кого-л. - to listen to /to hear/ * внять доводам рассудка;
прислушаться к голосу разума - to speak /to talk/ * говорить /судить/ здраво - you can't make him listen to *, he will not listen to * он и слышать ничего не хочет, его не убедишь - there is * in what you say в том, что вы говорите, есть здравый смысл - contrary to * идущий вразрез со здравым смыслом - it is quite within * to suggest... благоразумно предположить...;
здраво рассуждая, можно предположить... - in * в разумных пределах;
в соответствии со здравым смыслом;
разумно - everything in * всему есть мера - to pay anything in * заплатить любую разумную цену - it is not in * to expect me to... было бы неразумно /странно/ ожидать, что я... - I'm willing to do anything in * в разумных пределах я готов сделать все - out of all * чрезмерный;
ни в какие ворота не лезет - the price is out of all * это несусветная цена - it cost me a sum out of all * я заплатил за это бешеные деньги - it stands to * разумеется;
понятно;
ясно;
очевидно( в ответах) ;
здравый смысл подсказывает - it stands to * that... всякому здравомыслящему человеку понятно, что...;
отсюда явно следует, что... - as in * как и следовало ожидать;
как и следует - as * was как подсказывал здравый смысл (редкое) разумный поступок;
(благо) разумное поведение - it is *, * is это (будет) благоразумно - it is no /not/ * это (будет) неразумно - it is but * that I should rejoice вполне понятно, что я радуюсь размышлять, рассуждать (логически) ;
делать выводы, умозаключать - to * about /of, on, upon/ a subject обдумывать что-л.;
размышлять /раздумывать, рассуждать/ о каком-л. предмете - to * from premises делать вывод из посылок;
сделать логический вывод - to * from past experience сделать выводы из опыта прошлого - to * that... прийти к выводу, что... - we must * from what is probable мы должны исходить из вероятности - I * in this way on the matter я прихожу к такому выводу по этому вопросу;
я так рассуждаю /сужу/ об этом деле мыслить - the ability to * makes man different from animals способность мыслить отличает человека от животного обсуждать;
дебатировать, дискутировать;
рассуждать (вслух) - to * what is to be done обсуждать, что (нужно) сделать - to * why smth. was done рассуждать о том, почему что-л. было сделано ( with) уговаривать, урезонивать (кого-л.) - we *ed with him for an hour мы целый час его урезонивали /пытались его убедить/ (into) уговорить, убедить ( в чем-л.) - to * smb. into smth. /into doing smth./ уговорить кого-л. сделать что-л. - to * smb. into obedience уговорить кого-л. подчиниться( out of) разубеждать (в чем-л.) - to * smb. out of smth. /out of doing smth./ отговорить кого-л. от чего-л.;
разубедить кого-л. - to * smb. out of his fears убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его опасений - to * smb out of a false belief убедить кого-л. в неосновательности его убеждения преим. р.р. обосновывать, аргументировать;
доказывать - to * that... аргументировать /мотивировать/ тем, что...;
приводить в качестве довода то, что... - you must * your case a bit more вы должны лучше обосновать /аргументировать/ свою позицию - his speech was admirably *ed его выступление было прекрасно аргументировано (with) (устаревшее) (библеизм) спорить или беседовать( с кем-л.) > their's not to * why (Tennyson) не их дело рассуждать о причинах actual ~ истинная причина bereft of ~ без сознания, без чувств bereft of ~ умалишенный ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ причина, повод, основание;
соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание;
by reason of по причине;
из-за by ~ of its general sense по своему общему смыслу cogent ~ убедительная причина compelling ~ неопровержимый довод to give reasons (for smth.) объяснить причины (чего-л.), сообщить свои соображения (по поводу чего-л.) with (или not without) ~ не без основания;
he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума primary ~ основная причина reason аргумент ~ аргументировать;
доказывать;
reason out продумать до конца ~ излагать мотивы ~ интеллект ~ мотив ~ обсуждать ~ основание ~ причина, повод, основание;
соображение, мотив;
довод, аргумент;
оправдание;
by reason of по причине;
из-за ~ причина ~ разум, рассудок;
благоразумие;
to bring to reason образумить;
to hear (или to listen to) reason прислушаться к голосу разума;
to lose one's reason сойти с ума ~ разум ~ рассуждать (about, of, upon - о чем-л.) ~ соображение ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ for remission of sentence основание для освобождения от наказания ~ for termination основание для прекращения ~ of complaint основание для подачи жалобы ~ of complaint основание для подачи иска ~ аргументировать;
доказывать;
reason out продумать до конца ~ убеждать, уговаривать (into) ;
to reason out (of smth.) разубеждать (в чем-л.) ;
to reason (with smb.) урезонивать (кого-л.) ~ to believe основание считать strong ~ веское основание strong: ~ сильный, веский;
серьезный;
strong sense of disappointment сильное разочарование;
strong reason веская причина valid ~ веское соображение valid ~ убедительный довод with (или not without) ~ не без основания;
he complains with reason он имеет все основания жаловаться -
7 sense
sense [sens]sens ⇒ 1 (a), 1 (c), 1 (e), 1 (f) sensation ⇒ 1 (b) sentiment ⇒ 1 (b) notion ⇒ 1 (c) bon sens ⇒ 1 (d) sentir ⇒ 2 (a) raison ⇒ 31 noun∎ the five senses les cinq sens mpl;∎ to have a keen sense of smell/hearing avoir l'odorat fin/l'ouïe fine;∎ she seemed to have a sixth sense elle semblait posséder un sixième sens;∎ to be in possession of all one's senses jouir de toutes ses facultés;∎ to excite the senses exciter les sens∎ a sense of pleasure/warmth une sensation de plaisir/chaleur;∎ I felt a certain sense of pleasure j'ai ressenti un certain plaisir;∎ a sense of achievement/injustice un sentiment d'accomplissement/d'injustice;∎ to have a sense of belonging avoir le sentiment d'être intégré;∎ I felt a sense of shame je me suis senti honteux;∎ children need a sense of security les enfants ont besoin de se sentir en sécurité;∎ there's a new sense of foreboding in her writing ses écrits sont maintenant empreints d'un sentiment d'angoisse devant l'avenir∎ she seems to have lost all sense of reality elle semble avoir perdu le sens des réalités;∎ I lost all sense of time j'ai perdu toute notion de l'heure;∎ to have a (good) sense of direction avoir le sens de l'orientation;∎ figurative she lost her sense of direction when her husband died elle s'est sentie complètement désorientée après la mort de son mari;∎ he has a good sense of humour il a le sens de l'humour;∎ I try to teach them a sense of right and wrong j'essaie de leur inculquer la notion du bien et du mal;∎ she acted out of a sense of duty/of responsibility elle a agi par sens du devoir/des responsabilités;∎ they have no business sense at all ils n'ont aucun sens des affaires;∎ he has an overdeveloped sense of his own importance il est trop imbu de lui-même(d) (practical wisdom) bon sens m;∎ to show good sense faire preuve de bon sens;∎ there's a lot of sense in what she says il y beaucoup de bon sens dans ce qu'elle dit, ce qu'elle dit est tout à fait sensé;∎ to have the (good) sense to do sth avoir l'intelligence ou le bon sens de faire qch;∎ to have more sense than to do sth avoir assez de bon sens pour ne pas faire qch;∎ they didn't even have enough sense to telephone ils n'ont même pas eu l'idée de téléphoner(e) (reason, rational quality) sens m;∎ there's no sense in all of us going cela ne rime à rien d'y aller tous;∎ I can't see any sense or the sense in continuing this discussion je ne vois pas l'intérêt de continuer cette discussion;∎ to see sense entendre raison;∎ to talk sense dire des choses sensées;∎ oh, come on, talk sense! voyons, ne dis pas n'importe quoi!;∎ can you make (any) sense of this message? est-ce que vous arrivez à comprendre ce message?;∎ it makes no sense ça n'a pas de sens;∎ it makes/doesn't make sense to wait c'est une bonne idée/idiot d'attendre;∎ it makes more sense to do this first c'est plus logique de commencer par cela;∎ that makes good sense c'est logique, c'est une bonne idée;∎ it makes good political/business sense to… il est bon sur le plan politique/commercial de…∎ don't take what I say in its literal sense ne prenez pas ce que je dis au sens propre ou au pied de la lettre;∎ in every sense of the word dans tous les sens du terme;∎ in the normal sense (of the word) à proprement parler;∎ I got the general sense j'ai saisi le sens général;∎ I think we have, in a very real sense, grasped the problem je crois que nous avons parfaitement saisi le problème;∎ this is not in any real sense a change of policy ça ne représente pas du tout un changement de politique;∎ in a sense dans un sens;∎ in no sense en aucune manière;∎ in more senses than one dans tous les sens;∎ in the sense that… en ce sens que…, dans le sens où…∎ I sensed something was wrong j'ai senti que quelque chose n'allait pas;∎ I sensed as much c'est bien l'impression ou le sentiment que j'avais;∎ I sensed her meaning j'ai compris ce qu'elle voulait dire(sanity, reason) raison f;∎ to come to one's senses (become conscious) reprendre connaissance; (be reasonable) revenir à la raison;∎ to take leave of one's senses perdre la raison ou la tête;∎ to bring sb to his/her senses ramener qn à la raison►► sense organ organe m sensoriel ou des sens -
8 Bibliography
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The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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9 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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10 good
ɡud
1. comparative - better; adjective1) (well-behaved; not causing trouble etc: Be good!; She's a good baby.) bueno; educado2) (correct, desirable etc: She was a good wife; good manners; good English.) bueno, correcto3) (of high quality: good food/literature; His singing is very good.) bueno4) (skilful; able to do something well: a good doctor; good at tennis; good with children.) bueno, competente5) (kind: You've been very good to him; a good father.) bueno, amable6) (helpful; beneficial: Exercise is good for you.; Cheese is good for you.) bueno; útil, beneficioso7) (pleased, happy etc: I'm in a good mood today.) bueno, buen (humor), satisfecho, contento8) (pleasant; enjoyable: to read a good book; Ice-cream is good to eat.) bueno, agradable9) (considerable; enough: a good salary; She talked a good deal of nonsense.) bueno, apropiado, adecuado, suficiente10) (suitable: a good man for the job.) bueno, apto, cualificado, adecuado11) (sound, fit: good health; good eyesight; a car in good condition.) bueno; sano; en buenas condiciones12) (sensible: Can you think of one good reason for doing that?) bueno13) (showing approval: We've had very good reports about you.) bueno, positivo14) (thorough: a good clean.) bueno; profundo15) (healthy or in a positive mood: I don't feel very good this morning.) bien, sano, en forma
2. noun1) (advantage or benefit: He worked for the good of the poor; for your own good; What's the good of a broken-down car?) bien, provecho, beneficio2) (goodness: I always try to see the good in people.) bien, bondad, lado bueno
3. interjection(an expression of approval, gladness etc.) bueno, bien- goodness
4. interjection((also my goodness) an expression of surprise etc.) ¡Dios mío!- goods- goody
- goodbye
- good-day
- good evening
- good-for-nothing
- good humour
- good-humoured
- good-humouredly
- good-looking
- good morning
- good afternoon
- good-day
- good evening
- good night
- good-natured
- goodwill
- good will
- good works
- as good as
- be as good as one's word
- be up to no good
- deliver the goods
- for good
- for goodness' sake
- good for
- good for you
- him
- Good Friday
- good gracious
- good heavens
- goodness gracious
- goodness me
- good old
- make good
- no good
- put in a good word for
- take something in good part
- take in good part
- thank goodness
- to the good
good1 adj1. bueno2. bueno / amablehe's been very good to me ha sido muy amable conmigo / se ha portado muy bien conmigogood for you! ¡bien hecho!to be good at something tener facilidad para algo / ser bueno en algogood2 n bienwhat's the good of shouting if nobody can hear you? ¿de qué sirve gritar si nadie te oye?tr[gʊd]1 bueno,-a (before m sing noun) buen2 (healthy) sano,-a3 (beneficial) bueno,-a4 (kind) amable5 (well-behaved) bueno,-a■ be good! ¡sé bueno!6 (useful) servible1 muy1 ¡bien!1 bien nombre masculino1 (property) bienes nombre masculino plural\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLa good deal bastanteall in good time todo a su debido tiempoas good as como si, prácticamente, casifor good para siemprefor the good of en bien degood afternoon buenas tardesgood evening buenas tardesGood Friday Viernes Santogood heavens!, good grief! ¡cielo santo!good morning buenos díasgood night buenas nochesit's a good job menos malthat's a good one! (joke) ¡ésta sí que es buena!to be as good as new estar como nuevo,-ato be as good as gold ser un ángelto be good at tener aptitudes parato be good for a laugh familiar ser muy divertido,-a, ser muy cachondo,-a■ he's good for nothing no sirve para nada, es un inútilto be up to no good estar tramando algoto do good hacer biento feel good sentirse biento have a good time pasarlo biento make good (be successful) tener éxito, salir bien 2 (reform) reformarse 3 (compensate) indemnizarwhat's the good of «+ ger»? ¿de qué sirve + inf?■ what's the good of denying it? ¿de qué sirve negarlo?goods train tren nombre masculino de mercancíasgoods yard estación nombre femenino de mercancíasstolen goods objetos nombre masculino plural robadosgood ['gʊd] adva good strong rope: una cuerda bien fuerte2) well: bien1) pleasant: bueno, agradablegood news: buenas noticiasto have a good time: divertirse2) beneficial: bueno, beneficiosogood for a cold: beneficioso para los resfriadosit's good for you: es bueno para uno3) full: completo, enteroa good hour: una hora entera4) considerable: bueno, bastantea good many people: muchísima gente, un buen número de gente5) attractive, desirable: bueno, biena good salary: un buen sueldoto look good: quedar bien6) kind, virtuous: bueno, amableshe's a good person: es buena gentethat's good of you!: ¡qué amable!good deeds: buenas obras7) skilled: bueno, hábilto be good at: tener facilidad para8) sound: bueno, sensatogood advice: buenos consejosgood morning: buenos díasgood afternoon (evening): buenas tardesgood night: buenas nochesgood n1) right: bien mto do good: hacer el bien2) goodness: bondad f3) benefit: bien m, provecho mit's for your own good: es por tu propio bien4) goods nplproperty: efectos mpl personales, posesiones fpl5) goods nplwares: mercancía f, mercadería f, artículos mpl6)for good : para siempreadj.• bueno, -a adj.n.• bien s.m.• provecho s.m.
I gʊd1) adjective (comp better; superl best) [The usual translation, bueno, becomes buen when it is used before a masculine singular noun]2) <food/quality/book> buenoit smells good — huele bien, tiene rico or buen olor (AmL)
to make good something: they undertook to make good the damage to the car se comprometieron a hacerse cargo de la reparación del coche; our losses were made good by the company la compañía nos compensó las pérdidas; to make good one's escape — lograr huir
3) ( creditable) <work/progress/results> bueno4) (opportune, favorable) <moment/day/opportunity> buenois this a good time to phone? — ¿es buena hora para llamar?
it's a good job nobody was listening — (colloq) menos mal que nadie estaba escuchando
5) (advantageous, useful) <deal/offer/advice> buenoburn it; that's all it's good for — quémalo, no sirve para otra cosa
it's a good idea to let them know in advance — convendría or no sería mala idea avisarles de antemano
good idea!, good thinking! — buena idea!
6) ( pleasant) buenoto be in a good mood — estar* de buen humor
I hope you have a good time in London — espero que te diviertas or que lo pases bien en Londres
did you have a good flight? — ¿qué tal el vuelo?
7) (healthy, wholesome) <diet/habit/exercise> buenoI'm not feeling too good — (colloq) no me siento or no me encuentro muy bien
spinach is good for you — las espinacas son buenas para la salud or son muy sanas
he drinks more than is good for him — bebe demasiado or más de la cuenta
8) ( attractive)she's got a good figure — tiene buena figura or buen tipo
that dress looks really good on her — ese vestido le queda or le sienta muy bien
9)a) ( in greetings)good morning — buenos días, buen día (RPl)
b) ( in interj phrases)good! now to the next question — bien, pasemos ahora a la siguiente pregunta
good grief/gracious! — por favor!
very good, sir/madam — (frml) lo que mande el señor/la señora (frml)
c) ( for emphasis) (colloq)d)as good as: it's as good as new está como nuevo; he as good as admitted it — prácticamente lo admitió
10) (skilled, competent) buenoto be good AT something/-ING: to be good at languages tener* facilidad para los idiomas; he's good at ironing plancha muy bien; he is good with dogs/children tiene buena mano con or sabe cómo tratar a los perros/los niños; she is good with her hands — es muy habilidosa or mañosa
11) (devoted, committed) buenoa good Catholic/socialist — un buen católico/socialista
12)a) (virtuous, upright) buenob) ( well-behaved) buenobe good — sé bueno, pórtate bien
13) ( kind) buenoto be good TO somebody: she was very good to me fue muy amable conmigo, se portó muy bien conmigo; it was very good of you to come muchas gracias por venir; good old Pete — el bueno de Pete
14) (decent, acceptable) buenogood manners — buenos modales mpl
to have a good reputation — tener* buena reputación
15) ( sound) <customer/payer> bueno16) ( valid) <argument/excuse> buenoit's simply not good enough! — esto no puede ser!, esto es intolerable!
17) (substantial, considerable) <meal/salary/distance> buenothere were a good many people there — había bastante gente or un buen número de personas allí
18) ( not less than)it'll take a good hour — va a llevar su buena hora or una hora larga
19) (thorough, intense) <rest/scolding> bueno
II
1)a) u ( moral right) bien mto do good — hacer* el bien
to be up to no good — (colloq) estar* tramando algo, traerse* algo entre manos
b) ( people)the good — (+ pl vb) los buenos
2) ua) ( benefit) bien mfor the good of somebody/something — por el bien de algn/algo
to do somebody/something good — hacerle* bien a algn/algo
lying won't do you any good at all — mentir no te llevará a ninguna parte, no ganarás or no sacarás nada con mentir
b) ( use)are you any good at drawing? — ¿sabes dibujar?
c) ( in phrases)3) goods pla) ( merchandise) artículos mpl, mercancías fpl, mercaderías fpl (AmS)manufactured goods — productos mpl manufacturados, manufacturas fpl
to come up with o deliver the goods — (colloq) cumplir con lo prometido; (before n) <train, wagon> (BrE) de carga; < depot> de mercancías, de mercaderías (AmS)
b) ( property) (frml) bienes mpl
III
it's been a good long while since... — ha pasado su buen tiempo desde...
you messed that up good and proper, didn't you? — (BrE colloq) metiste bien la pata, ¿no? (fam)
2) (AmE colloq) (well, thoroughly) bien[ɡʊd]1. ADJECTIVE(compar better) (superl best) When good is part of a set combination, eg in a good temper, a good deal of, good heavens, look up the noun. The commonest translation of good is bueno, which must be shortened to buen before a masculine singular noun.1) (=satisfactory)a) buenoNote that [bueno]/[buena] {etc} precede the noun in general comments where there is no attempt to compare or rank the person or thing involved:at the end of the day, it's a good investment — a fin de cuentas es una buena inversión
[Bueno]/[buena] {etc} follow the noun when there is implied or explicit comparison:if he set his mind to it, he could be a very good painter — si se lo propusiera podría ser muy buen pintor
Use [ser] rather than [estar] with [bueno] when translating [to be good], unless describing food:I'm not saying it's a good thing or a bad thing — no digo que sea una cosa buena, ni mala
Use [estar] with the adverb [bien] to give a general comment on a situation:it's good to be aware of the views of intelligent people — es bueno conocer los puntos de vista de la gente inteligente
you've written a book, which is good — has escrito un libro, lo que está bien
his hearing is good — del oído está bien, el oído lo tiene bien
b)•
she's good at maths — se le dan bien las matemáticas, es buena en matemáticasshe's good at putting people at their ease — tiene la capacidad de hacer que la gente se sienta relajada
•
that's good enough for me — eso me bastait's just not good enough! — ¡esto no se puede consentir!
40% of candidates are not good enough to pass — el 40% de los candidatos no dan el nivel or la talla para aprobar
•
to feel good — sentirse bienI don't feel very good about that * — (=I'm rather ashamed) me da bastante vergüenza
•
we've never had it so good! * — ¡nunca nos ha ido tan bien!, ¡jamás lo hemos tenido tan fácil!•
how good is her eyesight? — ¿qué tal está de la vista?•
you're looking good — ¡qué guapa estás!things are looking good — las cosas van bien, la cosa tiene buena pinta *
you look good in that — eso te sienta or te va bien
•
it's too good to be true — no puede ser, es demasiado bueno para ser ciertohe sounds too good to be true! — ¡algún defecto tiene que tener!
good 2., manner 4), a), mood II, 1., time 1., 5)•
she's good with cats — entiende bien a los gatos, sabe manejarse bien con los gatos2) (=of high quality)always use good ingredients — utilice siempre ingredientes de calidad or los mejores ingredientes
3) (=pleasant) [holiday, day] bueno, agradable; [weather, news] bueno•
it was as good as a holiday — aquello fue como unas vacaciones•
have a good journey! — ¡buen viaje!•
how good it is to know that...! — ¡cuánto me alegro de saber que...!•
it's good to see you — me alegro de verte, gusto en verte (LAm)alive, life 1., 3)•
have a good trip! — ¡buen viaje!4) (=beneficial, wholesome) [food] bueno, sano; [air] puro, sano•
it's good for burns — es bueno para las quemadurasit's good for you or your health — te hace bien
all this excitement isn't good for me! — ¡a mí todas estas emociones no me vienen or sientan nada bien!
it's good for the soul! — hum ¡ennoblece el espíritu!, ¡te enriquece (como persona)!
some children know more than is good for them — algunos niños son demasiado listos or saben demasiado
5) (=favourable) [moment, chance] bueno•
it's a good chance to sort things out — es una buena oportunidad de or para arreglar las cosas•
I tried to find something good to say about him — traté de encontrar algo bueno que decir de él•
this is as good a time as any to do it — es tan buen momento como cualquier otro para hacerlo6) (=useful)the only good chair — la única silla que está bien, la única silla servible or sana
•
to be good for (doing) sth — servir para (hacer) algothe ticket is good for three months — el billete es válido or valedero para tres meses
he's good for nothing — es un inútil, es completamente inútil
7) (=sound, valid) [excuse] buenoword 1., 1)•
he is a good risk — (financially) concederle crédito es un riesgo asumible, se le puede prestar dinero8) (=kind)•
that's very good of you — es usted muy amable, ¡qué amable (de su parte)!•
he was so good as to come with me — tuvo la amabilidad de acompañarmeplease would you be so good as to help me down with my case? — ¿me hace el favor de bajarme la maleta?, ¿tendría la bondad de bajarme la maleta? more frm
would you be so good as to sign here? — ¿me hace el favor de firmar aquí?
nature 1., 2)•
he was good to me — fue muy bueno or amable conmigo, se portó bien conmigo9) (=well-behaved) [child] buenobe good! — (morally) ¡sé bueno!; (in behaviour) ¡pórtate bien!; (at this moment) ¡estáte formal!
- be as good as gold10) (=upright, virtuous) buenohe's a good man — es una buena persona, es un buen hombre
•
I think I'm as good as him — yo me considero tan buena persona como él•
yes, my good man — sí, mi querido amigo•
send us a photo of your good self — frm tenga a bien enviarnos una foto suyalady 1., 5)•
she's too good for him — ella es más de lo que él se merece11) (=close) bueno•
he's a good friend of mine — es un buen amigo míomy good friend Fernando — mi buen or querido amigo Fernando
12) (=middle-class, respectable)13) (=creditable)14) (=considerable) [supply, number] buenowe were kept waiting for a good hour/thirty minutes — nos tuvieron esperando una hora/media hora larga, nos tuvieron esperando por lo menos una hora/media hora
a good £10 — lo menos 10 libras
15) (=thorough) [scolding] bueno•
to have a good cry — llorar a lágrima viva, llorar a moco tendido *•
to take a good look (at sth) — mirar bien (algo)16)17) (in greetings)good! — ¡muy bien!
(that's) good! — ¡qué bien!, ¡qué bueno! (LAm)
very good, sir — sí, señor
old 1., 5) as good as•
good one! — (=well done, well said) ¡muy bien!, ¡sí señor!to come good good and...as good as saying... — tanto como decir...
to hold good valer ( for para) it's a good jobgood and hot * — bien calentito *
make 1., 3), riddance, thing 2)(it's a) good job he came! * — ¡menos mal que ha venido!
2. ADVERB1) (as intensifier) biena good long walk — un paseo bien largo, un buen paseo
- give as good as one getsgood and properthey were cheated good and proper * — les timaron bien timados *, les timaron con todas las de la ley *
2) (esp US) * (=well) bien"how are you?" - "thanks, I'm good" — -¿cómo estás? -muy bien, gracias
3. NOUN1) (=virtuousness) el bien•
to do good — hacer (el) bien•
he is a power for good — su influencia es muy buena or beneficiosa, hace mucho bien•
there's some good in him — tiene algo bueno2) (=advantage, benefit) bien m•
a rest will do you some good — un descanso te sentará bienthe sea air does you good — el aire del mar le hace or sienta a uno bien
a (fat) lot of good that will do you! * — iro ¡menudo provecho te va a traer!
much good may it do you! — ¡no creo que te sirva de mucho!, ¡para lo que te va a servir!
•
for your own good — por tu propio bien•
to be in good with sb — estar a bien con algn•
that's all to the good! — ¡menos mal!•
what good will that do you? — ¿y eso de qué te va a servir?what's the good of worrying? — ¿de qué sirve or para qué preocuparse?
3) (=people of virtue)the good los buenos any goodis he any good? — [worker, singer etc] ¿qué tal lo hace?, ¿lo hace bien?
is this any good? — ¿sirve esto?
for good (and all) (=for ever) para siempreis she any good at cooking? — ¿qué tal cocina?, ¿cocina bien?
no goodhe's gone for good — se ha ido para siempre or para no volver
it's no good — (=no use) no sirve
it's no good, I'll never get it finished in time — así no hay manera, nunca lo terminaré a tiempo
it's no good saying that — de nada sirve or vale decir eso
it's no good worrying — de nada sirve or vale preocuparse, no se saca nada preocupándose
that's no good — eso no vale or sirve
4.COMPOUNDSthe Good Book N — (Rel) la Biblia
good deeds NPL — = good works
good faith N — buena fe f
Good Friday N — (Rel) Viernes m Santo
good guy N — (Cine) bueno m
good looks NPL — atractivo msing físico
good name N — buen nombre m
good works NPL — buenas obras fpl
* * *
I [gʊd]1) adjective (comp better; superl best) [The usual translation, bueno, becomes buen when it is used before a masculine singular noun]2) <food/quality/book> buenoit smells good — huele bien, tiene rico or buen olor (AmL)
to make good something: they undertook to make good the damage to the car se comprometieron a hacerse cargo de la reparación del coche; our losses were made good by the company la compañía nos compensó las pérdidas; to make good one's escape — lograr huir
3) ( creditable) <work/progress/results> bueno4) (opportune, favorable) <moment/day/opportunity> buenois this a good time to phone? — ¿es buena hora para llamar?
it's a good job nobody was listening — (colloq) menos mal que nadie estaba escuchando
5) (advantageous, useful) <deal/offer/advice> buenoburn it; that's all it's good for — quémalo, no sirve para otra cosa
it's a good idea to let them know in advance — convendría or no sería mala idea avisarles de antemano
good idea!, good thinking! — buena idea!
6) ( pleasant) buenoto be in a good mood — estar* de buen humor
I hope you have a good time in London — espero que te diviertas or que lo pases bien en Londres
did you have a good flight? — ¿qué tal el vuelo?
7) (healthy, wholesome) <diet/habit/exercise> buenoI'm not feeling too good — (colloq) no me siento or no me encuentro muy bien
spinach is good for you — las espinacas son buenas para la salud or son muy sanas
he drinks more than is good for him — bebe demasiado or más de la cuenta
8) ( attractive)she's got a good figure — tiene buena figura or buen tipo
that dress looks really good on her — ese vestido le queda or le sienta muy bien
9)a) ( in greetings)good morning — buenos días, buen día (RPl)
b) ( in interj phrases)good! now to the next question — bien, pasemos ahora a la siguiente pregunta
good grief/gracious! — por favor!
very good, sir/madam — (frml) lo que mande el señor/la señora (frml)
c) ( for emphasis) (colloq)d)as good as: it's as good as new está como nuevo; he as good as admitted it — prácticamente lo admitió
10) (skilled, competent) buenoto be good AT something/-ING: to be good at languages tener* facilidad para los idiomas; he's good at ironing plancha muy bien; he is good with dogs/children tiene buena mano con or sabe cómo tratar a los perros/los niños; she is good with her hands — es muy habilidosa or mañosa
11) (devoted, committed) buenoa good Catholic/socialist — un buen católico/socialista
12)a) (virtuous, upright) buenob) ( well-behaved) buenobe good — sé bueno, pórtate bien
13) ( kind) buenoto be good TO somebody: she was very good to me fue muy amable conmigo, se portó muy bien conmigo; it was very good of you to come muchas gracias por venir; good old Pete — el bueno de Pete
14) (decent, acceptable) buenogood manners — buenos modales mpl
to have a good reputation — tener* buena reputación
15) ( sound) <customer/payer> bueno16) ( valid) <argument/excuse> buenoit's simply not good enough! — esto no puede ser!, esto es intolerable!
17) (substantial, considerable) <meal/salary/distance> buenothere were a good many people there — había bastante gente or un buen número de personas allí
18) ( not less than)it'll take a good hour — va a llevar su buena hora or una hora larga
19) (thorough, intense) <rest/scolding> bueno
II
1)a) u ( moral right) bien mto do good — hacer* el bien
to be up to no good — (colloq) estar* tramando algo, traerse* algo entre manos
b) ( people)the good — (+ pl vb) los buenos
2) ua) ( benefit) bien mfor the good of somebody/something — por el bien de algn/algo
to do somebody/something good — hacerle* bien a algn/algo
lying won't do you any good at all — mentir no te llevará a ninguna parte, no ganarás or no sacarás nada con mentir
b) ( use)are you any good at drawing? — ¿sabes dibujar?
c) ( in phrases)3) goods pla) ( merchandise) artículos mpl, mercancías fpl, mercaderías fpl (AmS)manufactured goods — productos mpl manufacturados, manufacturas fpl
to come up with o deliver the goods — (colloq) cumplir con lo prometido; (before n) <train, wagon> (BrE) de carga; < depot> de mercancías, de mercaderías (AmS)
b) ( property) (frml) bienes mpl
III
it's been a good long while since... — ha pasado su buen tiempo desde...
you messed that up good and proper, didn't you? — (BrE colloq) metiste bien la pata, ¿no? (fam)
2) (AmE colloq) (well, thoroughly) bien -
11 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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12 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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13 Mind-body Problem
From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)[The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem
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